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Abstract 
 
This paper examines a single consultation of the Delphic oracle by the city of Athens, known 
from a detailed inscription and references in fragmentary historians. It aims to explore the 
way in which the processes involved worked to encourage and maintain the belief of 
Athenians in the power of the gods to intervene in human affairs. The conclusions raise 
implications for the examination of cognitive aspects of divination more generally. 
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There are many challenges faced by those who want to use the tools of modern cognitive 
science to investigate historical religious phenomena, especially ancient historical religious 
phenomena. The lack of usable data is an obvious example – we have very little quantitative 
data from the ancient world, and much of the evidence we do have has to be interpreted 
before it can be used at all. But there is a further problem when it comes to comparative 
study: can we tell whether we are comparing like with like? There are phenomena where 
comparative historical study may have great potential, and divination is one such.1 However, 
identifying all the elements that made divination function in any particular context can be 
more difficult than it first appears. In this paper I am taking advantage of the existence of an 
inscription that gives very precise details of one consultation of the Delphic oracle, and using 
																																																						
1 This reflection emerges from my involvement in the Research Project Cognitive 
Approaches to Ancient Religious Experience organised by Esther Eidinow and Armin Geertz 
(https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/classics/research/projects/caare/intro.aspx). This paper, and 
all my recent research in ancient religion, has benefited from my involvement with CAARE 
and with Armin and his colleagues at the University of Aarhus. 
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it to analyse that single example of an act of divination. This will, I hope, help to identify 
what approaches can be used in the future to explore the role of divination in religion and 
society. 
 
This is a paper about religious belief or, to be more precise, about one particular religious 
belief: that in 352 BCE the god Apollo instructed the Athenians not to cultivate an area of 
land on the edge of their territory. This was a belief widely shared by the Athenians of the 
time, which had a direct effect on their subsequent actions. The episode that led to the 
establishing of this belief has been examined quite frequently, but the focus of these 
examinations has tended to be practical: interest has been in what we can learn about how the 
Delphic oracle functioned, or how the Athenians treated sacred land (e.g. McDonald 1996; 
Scafuro 2003; Rhodes & Osborne 2003: 272-281; Bowden 2005: 88-95; Papazarkadas 2011: 
244-259). I want to approach the episode from a different angle, and suggest that it can tell us 
something about religion and cognition, demonstrating some of the ways in which beliefs 
could be created and sustained in ancient Greece. 
 
The area of land that was at issue in this episode was known as the ‘Sacred Orgas’. It was 
recognised as belonging to the sanctuary of the Two Goddesses, Demeter and Kore, at 
Eleusis, and it lay on the border between Attica and Megara. Responsibility for maintaining 
the sanctuary and its property, and for overseeing the religious rituals performed there, lay 
with the Athenian assembly. The Sacred Orgas had by tradition been left uncultivated, and, 
more problematically, had no boundary stones marking its extent. In the 350s the Athenians 
wanted to put part of the land, referred to as the ‘edgelands’ (eschatiai) under cultivation, 
renting it to raise money to repair parts of the sanctuary buildings. This somehow led to 
conflict with the Megarians, presumably because some of the land now to be cultivated was 
considered by the Megarians to be their territory. There was some military activity, and then 
it was agreed that the exact position of the boundary should be determined, and that it should 
be marked using inscribed stones (horoi or stelai). But at the same time the Athenians 
consulted the Delphic Oracle about whether they should be cultivating the edgelands, and 
they were told that they should not. We know about this from two sources. One is an 
inscription recording the decision of the Athenian assembly about how the location of the 
boundaries of the territory should be determined, and about the process for consulting the 
Oracle. The other is commentary on the speeches of Demosthenes by Didymus of Alexandria 
written in the first century BC. Explaining Demosthenes’ reference to the ‘accursed’ 
	 3 
Megarians annexing part of the Orgas (Dem. 13.32), Didymus gives the accounts of two 
fourth-century historians of Attica, Androtion (c. 410-c. 330) and Philochorus (c. 340-c. 260 
BCE), who describe the events. Androtion had been active in Athenian politics for a long 
time when these events took place. He refers to consultation of the Oracle in these words: 
 
And the edgelands (eschatiai), such as were next to the Orgas, they consecrated after 
consulting the Oracle and when the god responded that it was more advantageous and 
better for them not to cultivate (the edgelands). And it was marked off with stone 
stelai in a circle on the motion of Philocrates.2 
 
The words that I have italicised are usually passed over without comment, taken to be simply 
reporting the result of the consultation whose details we know from the inscription.3 They 
deserve close attention however, since they add up to a statement of religious belief, as the 
historian is putting forward a proposition about the action of a supernatural being. Because it 
is a proposition clearly presented, it must count as a reflective belief, to use the term of 
Sperber (1997). It might be argued that this is putting too much weight on what is a 
commonplace – since ‘the Greeks’ regularly consulted oracles, this is merely a periphrasis for 
saying that this was an oracular response. I will go on to show why, in this particular case, the 
matter is a little bit more complicated, but I want to suggest first that such a response is in 
danger of creating a circular argument, and ignores the question of why the Greeks continued 
to consult oracles over a long historical period.  
 
There is no doubt that divination, including but not limited to the consultation of oracles, 
played a large part in ancient Greek public and private life (Johnston 2009). Equally it is clear 
that consulting the gods was not seen as a trivial matter. Divination through the examination 
of the entrails of a sacrificed animal was a common practice for private and public divination, 
																																																						
2 BNJ 324 F30. Italics are mine. Philochorus’ account is BNJ 328 F155: it is recognised as 
being dependant on Androtion’s, although as recorded by Didymus it includes details not 
mentioned by the earlier writer (see BNJ ad loc.). 
3 Jacoby (1954: 142-143) does not comment on these words, nor does Jones (BNJ ad loc.), 
nor is it mentioned in the most recent commentary on Didymus (Harding 2006). 
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but it was not treated lightly.4 Visits to consult oracles could be very powerful emotional 
experiences. We will examine what happened at Delphi later in this paper, but ancient 
accounts of consultation at the oracle of Trophonius in Lebadea, for example, depict the 
process as potentially traumatic (Bonnechere 2003). Furthermore, there was no guarantee that 
divination would be successful. Xenophon, probably the most useful ancient writer about the 
practicalities of divination (Bowden 2004), notes more than once that the gods only 
communicate with those whom they wish to help (Cyropaedia 1.6.46; Hipparchicus 9.9). It is 
a commonplace of ancient Greek drama to represent manteis (seers or soothsayers) being 
attacked as frauds or traitors by the powerful rulers who consult them (Flower 2008: 132-
152). This representation of manteis being held in suspicion, and being disbelieved, goes 
back to the birth of Greek literature, in the poems of Homer. There was also a shared 
understanding that even when the gods did communicate through divination, their messages 
would not be easy to interpret: divination created the risk that human failure to understand the 
divine might lead to disaster (Kindt 2016). Therefore, although the use of divination has been 
helpfully examined as a way in which the ancient Greeks managed risk (Eidinow 2007), it 
was not without risks itself. We do have examples of what happened when the divinatory 
process apparently failed. Thucydides describes one occasion, when news came to Athens of 
the destruction of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 413 BCE, when Athenian belief in 
divination was severely tested: ‘they were angry with the orators who had joined in 
promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were enraged also 
with the chresmologoi (oracle-collectors) and manteis, and with whoever had then 
encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily’ (Thucydides 8.1.1). This was a 
short-term reaction (Parker 2005: 113-114), but it demonstrates that belief in divination could 
be challenged, and was. This meant that ‘belief in oracles’ (meaning both the recognition that 
they were indeed the source of divine communication, and the willingness to put trust in 
them) was something that needed continually to be reinforced. We can see how this might 
have happened if we return to the consultation of 352 BCE. 
 
The inscription mentioned earlier (IG ii3 292 = RO 58) gives a detailed description of process 
by which the Athenians consulted the Delphic oracle on this occasion: 
 
																																																						
4 See for example the detailed thought-process described by Xenophon in relation to a 
sacrifice he made (Anabasis 6.1.22-4). 
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[Decided:] that the Secretary of the Council write on two sheets of tin, equal and 
alike, on the one: if it is more profitable and better for the people of Athens that the 
Basileus lease out the parts of the Sacred Orgas now under cultivation, the parts 
outside the boundaries, to pay for the building of the portico and the repair of the 
sanctuary of the Two Goddesses; on the other sheet of tin: if it is more profitable and 
better for the people of Athens that the parts of the Sacred Orgas now under 
cultivation, the parts outside the boundaries, be left untilled for the Two Goddesses; 
as soon as the secretary has written on it, the President of the Proedroi shall take each 
sheet of tin and wrap it up; having wrapped each in wool, he shall put them into a 
bronze jug in view of the People; 
 
the Prytaneis shall prepare these things, and the treasurers of the Goddess shall bring 
forward a gold and a silver jug right away to the people, and the president, having 
shaken the bronze jug, shall take out the sheets of tin each in turn and put the first one 
into the golden jug and the second into the silver jug and close them up, and the 
President of the Prytaneis shall seal them with the public seal, and whoever of the 
other Athenians wishes shall add their seal; as soon as they have been sealed, the 
treasurers shall carry the jugs to the acropolis; 
 
the people shall choose three men, one from the Council and two from all Athenians, 
who will go to Delphi and ask the God which of the inscriptions the Athenians should 
act in accordance with concerning the Sacred Orgas, the one from the gold jug or the 
one from the silver; 
 
as soon as they have returned from the God they shall bring in the jugs and the 
oracular response and the inscriptions on the sheets of tin shall be read to the people; 
whichever of the inscriptions the God announces to be more profitable and better for 
the people of the Athenians, they shall act in accordance with it, in order that matters 
concerning the Two Goddesses may be as pious as possible, and that never in the time 
to come may anything impious occur concerning the Sacred Orgas and concerning the 
other sacred places of Athens.5 
																																																						
5 Translation mine. The Basileus was the magistrate responsible for overseeing, amongst 
other things, matters relating to the sanctuary of the Two Goddesses. The Proedroi and 
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The decree proposes a process characterised by ‘the elaboration of ritual and the involvement 
of a much wider range of officials than the action involved would seem to demand’ (Rhodes 
and Osborne 2003: 281). The inscription describes a sequence of events: first, the initial 
meeting of the Assembly when the decisions recorded were made; then, presumably, a 
second meeting of the Assembly, when the inscribed pieces of tin were to be publicly put into 
the jars and sealed; the visit of the Athenian envoys to Delphi to consult the Oracle; finally 
the third meeting of the Assembly when the jars were to be reopened and the answer 
revealed. It will be helpful to examine them in reverse chronological order. 
 
It is, paradoxically, not at Delphi, but in Athens, at the third assembly meeting, that the 
answer to the real question at issue was revealed. Meetings of the Athenian Assembly were 
inevitably theatrical events: there was a large audience of several thousand citizens, who 
watched and listened to the few principal actors (anyone was entited to take part in debate, 
but it is clear that the vast majority of those who attended never spoke). The scenario 
described in the inscription reads very much like a scene from a Greek tragedy (not all of 
which had tragic endings): messengers enter, and bring news from the Delphic Oracle, and at 
the same time the treasurers carry the gold and silver jars from the acropolis onto the Pnyx, 
the hill where the Assembly met; the messengers then read out the information as to which 
jar contains the God’s instructions. It is only at this point that the god’s will is revealed, and 
all the assembled Athenians hear it together. This revelation is the climactic event, and we 
know from the inscription what the god’s actual words were: ‘it is more profitable and better 
for the people of Athens that the parts of the Sacred Orgas now under cultivation, the parts 
outside the boundaries, be left untilled for the Two Goddesses’. Androtion reports these 
words (slightly abbreviated) as what the god said (rather than as what had been written by the 
secretary). 
 
Of course we know, and everyone who was present for this event knew, that the form of 
words had been drafted by the proposer of the decree recorded in the inscription (the first part 
of the inscription is missing, so we do not know their name). One of the effects of the various 
procedures that the inscription prescribes is that human words are transformed into divine 
																																																						
Prytaneis were subgroups of the Council of 500, which was the body that prepared business 
for the Assembly. 
	 7 
words. That is to say, they gain authority equivalent to that of words actually spoken by the 
Pythia in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. Indeed from an Athenian perspective their authority 
is even greater, because there is no possibility that the god’s words have been misrecorded or 
misreported by the envoys sent to consult the Oracle. Part of the explanation for this lies with 
the notion of theatricality discussed above. In classical Athens, Greek drama was performed 
within the context of major religious festivals, and most importantly as part of the City 
Dionysia (Goldhill 1987). That festival combined the celebration of civic virtues with 
performances of plays which often depicted the gods interacting with human beings, and 
speaking. Productions were lavish, with the chorus singing and dancing while wearing lavish, 
and with potentially spectacular stage effects.6 In comparison, the choreographed revelation 
of the words of Apollo to the Athenians in 352 BCE will have been lower-key, despite props 
including gold and silver vases, which were probably quite large. Nonetheless the association 
between drama, the city and the gods will have had its effect on how the assembly responded 
to the words read off the pieces of tin drawn from the vases. In tragedies a problematic 
situation might be resolved by the dramatic appearance of a god, flying onto the stage with 
the help of elaborate machinery to deliver a decisive speech; in the assembly the resolution of 
the dilemma facing the citizens was achieved when the divine answer was dramatically 
drawn from a beautiful glittering vessel. Obviously however, what gave the words their 
authority was the fact that the Delphic Oracle had been consulted about the matter, and it is to 
that consultation that we should now turn. 
 
We have plentiful literary evidence about the Delphic Oracle, in particular from the fifth 
century BCE (in particular in the works of Herodotus and the Attic tragedians) and the early 
second century CE (e.g. Plutarch, Oracles at Delphi no Longer Given in Verse). This allows 
us to construct with some confidence the basic sequence of the events of a consultation 
(Fontenrose 1978: 196-228; Bowden 2005: 12-39; Chalupa 2014: 27-30). All the participants 
(enquirers, priestess, other Delphians) took part in various preliminary rituals, including, for 
the enquirers, an animal sacrifice. This would, among other things, have worked to emphasise 
the solemnity of the process. The enquirers would have approached the place where the 
consultation took place, through the sanctuary, which was filled with rich treasuries 
																																																						
6 For what is known about Greek theatre in the fourth century, see Wilson 2000, Csapo et al. 
2014. 
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displaying dedications, including much gold and silver.7 Although there is still some 
scholarly disagreement, it is now generally accepted that the enquirers spoke directly to the 
priestess, who replied directly to them, and that her words were entirely comprehensible. 
Enquirers from cities, like the Athenians in 352, would have written down the response 
immediately. 
 
Studies of the psychological aspects of the functioning of the Delphic oracle have usually 
focused on the mental state of the Pythia, the priestess of Apollo who actually gave the 
responses (e.g. Chalupa 2014). Studies have examined the physical environment of the 
chamber where she sat, and considered what psychotropic substances she might have had 
access to (Lehoux 2007). More profitably the mantic session has been examined in 
comparison to modern examples of ‘spirit possession’ (Maurizio 1995). For our purposes 
however it is the mental state of the enquirers which is more important than that of the 
priestess, and the consultation should be seen as an event that required the active involvement 
of all the participants.8 
 
Once again we are fortunate that we know, more or less, the precise question that the 
Athenian envoys asked the Oracle. In most cases the question has to be inferred from the 
responses we have, or is not known.9 The question was, ‘with which of the inscriptions 
should the Athenians act in accordance concerning the Sacred Orgas, the one from the gold 
jug or the one from the silver?’ We also know that the answer clearly identified one or other 
jug: there appears to have been no possibility of ambiguity or confusion. We do not know 
whether the procedure for consultation that the Athenians employed in this case, which 
effectively ruled out any flexibility in the consultation process, was typical, but there is no 
																																																						
7 In 352 BCE the sanctuary was not necessarily looking at its best. There had been significant 
damage from an earthquake in 373, which meant that consultation of the oracle may have 
taken place in a temporary structure rather than the temple itself. In 356 the sanctuary had 
been taken over by the a Phocian army, at the start of the so-called Sacred War, which lasted 
until 346. By then, much of the gold and other precious dedications had been ‘borrowed’ by 
the Phocians to pay for the war, but it is likely that little if any of the sanctuaries wealth had 
disappeared by the time the Athenian envoys arrived (Scott 2014: 148-155). 
8 See the article by Esther Eidinow in this volume. 
9 For a full catalogue of responses see Fontenrose 1978: 240-416. 
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good reason to suppose that it was not the normal Athenian practice in the fourth century, 
(Bowden 2005: 92-93) and it may have been developed earlier, and used by other states too. 
 
From an external perspective, this procedure is effectively a very elaborate and expensive 
way of making a random binary choice, no different from tossing a coin. In this it resembles 
many other forms of cleromancy, including for example the procedures for consulting the 
Yijing, which developed at more or less the same time (Shaughnessy 2014). Tossing a coin in 
the twenty-first century is recognised as a leaving the result to chance. Cleromancy on the 
other hand is aimed at learning the correct answer to a question, even if the mechanism by 
which this is effected cannot be explained. The process of consulting the Delphic Oracle does 
however imply a clear narrative of what is happening: the answer to the Athenians’ question 
comes from Apollo. Apollo knows what the Two Goddesses wish should happen to the 
Sacred Orgas, and he can read what is written on each of the inscriptions within the metal 
jugs.10 If this is accepted, then the outcome of the consultation will not be understood as 
random. Whether that narrative was ever articulated in those terms by anyone involved in the 
process is not knowable. The basic elements of it, that Apollo, a god, knew what other gods 
wanted, and could see into a solid metal jug (while still being able to read the piece of solid 
metal inside it) are the kind of minimally counter-intuitive beliefs that, it has been argued, the 
human mind naturally adopts about the gods (Boyer 2001). 
 
Only three Athenians were sent to Delphi to ask the question about the gold and silver jugs, 
and only they will have been influenced directly by the events of the consultation. But Athens 
regularly sent embassies to consult the oracle, presumably, as in this case, made up of men 
selected by lot from the citizen body. It is quite likely that when the decision to send the 
envoys was made, and when they reported back after their visit, many of those present on the 
Pnyx in Athens will have brought to mind their own experiences of visiting the sanctuary, or 
stories told to them by friends and relatives who had been there. This shared experience of 
what it was like to consult the Delphic Oracle will have contributed to the construction of the 
belief that the response revealed something about Apollo. 
 
																																																						
10 Herodotus (147.3), writing some 70 years earlier, includes what purports to be an oracular 
response from Delphi which begins: ‘I know the number of the grains of sand and the 
dimensions of the sea, and understand the mute and hear the voiceless’. 
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What I have offered here is a redescription of a sequence of events that took place in ancient 
Athens and Delphi, that resulted in the widespread holding of a particular belief about the 
god Apollo. What has this to offer to modern cognitive science of religion, and in particular 
to the modern investigation of divination? I suggest that two related features of my account 
are significant here. The first, which may appear obvious, is that trust in the veracity of an 
oracular response cannot be separated from the nexus of other beliefs (mostly, but not all, 
non-reflective, or intuitive, in Sperber’s terms) about the divine that were shared by the 
Athenians and throughout the wider Mediterranean world. The second is that these beliefs 
cannot be understood as purely mental states. Most of the processes I have described are 
physical, to do with ritual activities, and sensory experiences rather than private rumination. 
 
Forms of divination are still widely practiced around the world (e.g. Peek 1991). In the 
industrialised west astrology, in more or less debased forms, remains a popular way of 
enquiring about the future, with over a quarter of Americans claiming to believe in it (Vyse 
2014: 19). However, the status of divination as a means of gathering information or seeking 
guidance is very different in the modern world from what it was in ancient Greece. There it 
was a universally accepted practice. The rhetoric of suspicion of manteis discussed above 
was not concerned to deny the validity of divination as a practice, but to emphasise that in 
any particular case there was the possibility of error. The narratives in which these critiques 
appear, in the poems of Homer, in Attic tragedy and in Herodotus’ Histories, invariably end 
up showing that the manteis or oracle that was challenged was right all along. The situation in 
the modern world is almost the opposite. Divination is generally characterised as a form of 
superstition, and its validity is consistently and thoroughly challenged in the name of 
‘science’ (Vyse 2014). Divination was condemned in the early Christian church (Hegedus 
2007), and texts condemning divination are found in the Hebrew Bible (Lev. 19.31, 20.6) and 
the Koran (5.90), and therefore it finds no support from ‘mainstream’ religious groups. Forms 
of divinatory practice, including reading Tarot cards, consulting the Yijing, and 
communicating with angels, are however features of ‘New Age’ spirituality (Sutcliffe 2014). 
The location of divination there, clearly identified as ‘alternative’ to mainstream religious and 
social organisation, could not therefore be more different from its place in ancient Greek 
culture. 
 
My account of the process by which the Athenian belief that Apollo had given them an 
instruction involved significant sensory elements. In particular there was the visual 
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theatricality of the processes involving the gold, silver and bronze jugs. The preparations 
made before the approach to the Pythia in Delphi, including the sacrifice of a sheep, will have 
engaged all the senses. These elements formed part of the larger whole of Greek polis 
religion, a term I am using here to emphasise that there was no neat boundary between 
religion and politics in Ancient Greece: ‘polis religion’ was the set of practices that the city 
engaged in to maintain good relations with the gods, and that was what was at stake in 352 
BCE. It involved processions, sacrifices, music, dance, athletic competitions, dedications of 
objects, the carrying, washing and dressing of cult statues and other cult objects, and many 
other rituals. Religion therefore was about far more than mental states: it was experienced 
through action and through the whole of the body. Modern approaches to religion are 
increasingly recognising that we need to consider embodied cognition and the role of sensory 
experience in the interpretation of religion (Day 2004; Deeley 2004). Divination as part of 
‘New Age spirituality’ is an area where the sensory is certainly present, as one reminiscence 
of the 1960s suggests: ‘In our homes we would frequently burn incense and keep little altars 
with eclectic collections of statues of Indian gods and goddesses, meditating Buddhas, 
yarrow stalks or coins for consulting the I Ching, and various personal “sacred” objects’ 
(Capra 2002). 
 
Our understanding of divination can undoubtedly be increased through comparative study, 
and the application of the tools of the cognitive science of religion. In a keynote lecture he 
gave in 2009, Armin Geertz said ‘I am firmly convinced that we need more scholars of 
religion to participate in the cognitive science of religion. If we don’t, then psychologists, 
anthropologists and neurologists will do it for us. I, for one, am not satisfied with simply 
ignoring the challenges that the cognitive sciences present to the comparative study of 
religion’ (Geertz 2015: 3). This paper may be read as an answer to that call, from a scholar of 
religion who can claim no expertise in the cognitive science of religion, but who recognises it 
as offering the best hope for deepening our understanding of religion, ancient and modern. At 
70 years of age, Armin has plenty of time ahead of him in which to lead scholars of religion 
forward along the road. 
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